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ABSTRACT
Although the Court in Miranda stated that custodial interrogation is
designed to undermine the will of the interogee, it has not
prohibited the admission of confession given under such
circumstances. It rather assumed that it is possible to dispel the
pressures of a custodial interrogation by means of proper
safeguards. The article claims that there is no plausible way to
dispel the coercive atmosphere engendered by a custodial
interrogation. Custody today constitutes a refined version of torture
used in the past in order to extract confessions. Consequently, the
confession of a suspect under circumstances of custodial
interrogation is involuntary and should not be admitted at trial.
Treating a custodial confession in this manner is justified by the
two main rationales underlying the requirement of voluntariness: 1)
ensuring the reliability of the confession, and 2) protecting the right
of the suspect to reach an autonomous decision.
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I.

Introduction

Despite the fact that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not recognize the need to
conduct an interrogation as grounds for detention,1 custodial interrogation is a
common practice.2 The leading judgment in Miranda extensively discussed the issue
of custodial interrogation.3 In effect, taking the statement of a suspect after
questioning him about his involvement in a criminal offense is a central means for
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The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3142(e) permits detention only if “after a hearing…the

judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community”.
2

Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1421-22 (1985).

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440, 482 (1966).
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investigating crime.4 The police interrogation is primarily directed at obtaining an
admission of guilt from a suspect who the police believe committed the offense that is
attributed to him.5 Indeed, many suspects make incriminating statements as the result
of an interrogation.6 A suspect’s admission of guilt during a police interrogation plays
a major role in the criminal process.7 Such a confession constitutes decisive evidence
at trial leading, in the overwhelmingly majority of cases, to a conviction.8 Detention is
a major investigative tool for the purpose of eliciting confessions from suspects.9
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n the United States, ‘interrogation’
has become a police technique, and detention for purposes of interrogation a common,
although generally unlawful, practice.”10 In contrast to the grounds of endangering
public safety or obstruction of justice, detention for the purposes of interrogation does
not attribute a future improper act to the suspect. Detention on these grounds is
primarily designed to ensure the convenience and effectiveness of the investigation.
4

HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 69 (1996);

Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English
and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 126 (1986).
5

Seth Goldberg, Missouri v. Seibert: The Multifactor Test Should be Replaced With a Bright-Line

Warning Rule to Strengthen Miranda’s Clarity, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2005); Raymond
J. Toney, English Criminal Procedure Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights:
Implications for Custodial Interrogation Practices, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L 411, 426 (2002); Boaz
Sangero, Miranda is Not Enough: A New Justification for Demanding ‘Strong Corroboration’ to a
Confession, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming, 2007).
6

Toney, supra note 5, at 426-27. Thus, according to a study conducted by Cassell and Hayman, a third

of all suspects admit to having committed the offense attributed to them: Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.
Hayman, Dialogue on Miranda: Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Miranda, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 839, 842 (1996). In England suspects confess in approximately 60
percent of all cases: GISLI H. GUDJONSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS 156 (2003).
7

Toney, supra note 5, at 426.

8

Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational

Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 983-84 (1997); Sangero, supra note 5.
9

Mark Berger, Legislating Confession Law in Great Britain: A Statutory Approach to Police

Interrogations, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 24 (1990); VAUGHAN BEVAN & KEN LIDSTONE,
A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, § 5.03 (1985) (“…the police
frequently arrest a presumptively guilty person at a very early stage in the investigation with little or no
evidence of the person’s guilt and set out to prove that guilt by custodial questioning.”).
10

Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 572 (1971).
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Detention serves two main purposes for police interrogators. The first is to act
as a means of pressure designed to induce the suspect to cooperate with the
interrogators. As the Court stated in Miranda, “… such an interrogation environment
is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner.”11 The second objective of detention is to enable investigative measures or
ruses that must be conducted within the confines of the detention facility. These
include planting an undercover agent in the suspect’s cell, in order to get him to make
an incriminating statement, and eavesdropping on the conversation of several persons
suspected of having being involved in the commission of an offense, who have been
brought together for this purpose.
Undoubtedly, an interrogation in a custodial setting is easier and more
effective for investigators than one conducted while the suspect is free.12 Detention
itself operates to undermine the suspect’s will to resist.13 It isolates the suspect and
deprives him of contact with his family and friends, who could provide him with
moral support that enables him to cope with the interrogation.14 It disrupts the
suspect’s daily routine and activities, such as: regular employment, normal dietary
habits, sleeping in a comfortable bed and taking a bath.15 The disruption of his daily
routine and the removal of the suspect from his normal environment create a sense of
isolation and anxiety, causing him to become dependent on his interrogators.16 The
suspect loses control over his life and it is the interrogators who determine the timing
and length of the interrogation, as well as the degree of pressure exerted.17 When he is
in this state of alienation and helplessness, it is easier for interrogators to exert
psychological pressure on the suspect in order to induce his cooperation, primarily by

11

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 465 (1966).

12

MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DETENTION BEFORE TRIAL 40 (1965).

13

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.

14

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50, 455; Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for

the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 110 (1989); Laurie Magid, Questioning
the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
883, 928 (1997); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 8, at 997.
15

Magid, supra note 14, at 929.

16

Hagit Lernau, A Research Evaluation of the Israeli New Pretrial Detention Act, 35 ISR. L. REV.

266, 267 (2001).
17

Ofshe & Leo, supra note 8, at 997.
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confessing.18 The harsh conditions of detention also operate to undermine the
suspect’s will to resist.19 It is no wonder, therefore, that custodial interrogations yield
many more confessions from suspects than interrogations conducted while suspects
are free.20
Certain investigative measures, such as planting an undercover agent as a
cellmate, are not physically possible when the suspect is free. Moreover, when the
suspect is in custody, it is much easier to obtain samples for the purposes of DNA
testing, such as secretions found on a used handkerchief or a saliva sample left on an
eating utensil, or to obtain physical evidence, such as an excreted bag of drugs.21
In Part II of this article, I will discuss the arguments supporting the use of
detention for the purpose of interrogation as an effective tool for inducing the suspect
to cooperate during the course of the investigation. Furthermore, in this part of the
article, I will discuss the main argument against this ground for detention, which
relates to the danger that the will of the interrogee will be broken. The assumption that
custodial interrogation acts to undermine the interrogee’s will to resist was the central
assumption underlying the Miranda ruling. This article will examine whether or not
this assumption is correct; and, by discussing the opposing arguments, it will conclude
that the very fact that many suspects act against their own best interests, confessing at
the police station to the offenses attributed to them, indeed demonstrates that their will
to resist has been undermined. Nonetheless, the Miranda ruling assumed that, with the
help of proper safeguards (which primarily consist of informing the suspect of his
right to remain silent and his right to consult with a defense attorney, retained or
appointed), it is possible to dispel the coercive atmosphere engendered by a custodial
interrogation. I will attempt to show that this assumption is naïve and that, in fact, it is
impossible to invent a rule that would completely dispel the coercive aspect of a
custodial interrogation.
Part III of the article will discuss the proper attitude that should be taken
regarding the confession of a suspect who is being held in custody. Since a suspect
usually admits his guilt to the police because his will to resist has been broken, a
18

Berger, supra note 9, at 24.

19

Lernau, supra note 16, at 267.

20

For the figures, see Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 872, 884.

21

For a clear example of seizing samples, during detention, for the purposes of testing, see R. v.

Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, sections 58-60.
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custodial confession should be treated as inadmissible. Such an attitude is dictated by
the two main rationales underlying the voluntariness requirement: ensuring the
reliability of the confession and protecting the right of the suspect to form an
autonomous decision.
Part IV of the article will examine the possibility to detain a suspect in order to
employ investigative tactics that can only be carried out in a detention facility, such as
planting an undercover agent as a cellmate. Although the argument regarding the
improper application of pressure is weaker when it is necessary to detain a person in
order to use techniques that can be physically employed only in a custodial setting,
and not just for the sake of exerting pressure, even such detention – which is not
designed to prevent a danger posed by the suspect – is a greater violation of the
presumption of innocence than is necessary.
This article will conclude that detention for the purpose of interrogation is
unlawful. Detention currently replaces the torture used in the past as a means for
breaking the willpower of the interrogee. However, a confession obtained in this
manner cannot be trusted and should not be relied on.

II.

Examining the Legitimacy of Detention for the Purpose of Exerting
Pressure

Detention for the purpose of advancing the investigation is accepted in many
countries, including France,22 England,23 Sweden,24 Hong Kong,25 India,26 South
Africa,27 China,28 Austria,29 and Israel.30 In contrast, this ground for detention is not
22

JOHN HATCHARD, BARBARA HUBER & RICHARD VOGLER EDS., COMPARATIVE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 80 (1996).
23

Section 37(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 permits the detention of a suspect

without charges if this “is necessary to secure or preserve evidence relating to an offence for which he
is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by questioning him.”
24

Hanns

von

Hofer,

Sweden,

in

FRIEDER

DÜNKEL

&

JOHN

VAGG

EDS.,

UNTERSUCHUNGSHAFT UND UNTERSUCHUNGSHAFTVOLLZUG / WAITING FOR TRIAL
576 (1994).
25

John Vagg, Hongkong, in DÜNKEL & VAGG, id. at 281.

26

Bhuvan B. Pande, India, in DÜNKEL & VAGG, id. at 303.

27

Dirk Van Zyl Smit, South Africa, in DÜNKEL & VAGG, id. at 675.
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considered proper in Germany.31 In England, some judges in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century believed that the police had no authority at all whatsoever to
interrogate suspects in custody.32 Nowadays, arresting a suspect for the purpose of
conducting an interrogation is, as already indicated, a statutory ground for detention.
Furthermore, the House of Lords has held it to be a proper purpose.33 Apart from the
fact that this ground for detention is officially recognized, it often constitutes a latent
cause of arrest.34
The legitimacy of detaining a suspect for the purpose of exerting pressure in
order to induce him to cooperate with his interrogators is disputed. An examination of
the arguments both supporting and opposing this ground for detention helps to
illustrate the tension between the crime control approach and the due process
approach.35
A.

Arguments Supporting Detention for the Purpose of Exerting

Pressure
The fact that an investigation is actually being conducted unavoidably entails a
violation of the rights of the individual. Even if a person is innocent, he pays a price
for the fact that there is incriminating evidence against him giving rise to probable
cause that he committed a crime. Just as it is possible, under these circumstances, to
28

Edward J. Epstein, Andrew C. Byrnes & Felice D. Gaer, The People’s Republic of China, in

DÜNKEL & VAGG, id. at 796
29

Roland Miklau, Inge Morawetz & Wolfgang Stangl, Pre-trial Detention in Austria, in STANISLAW

FRANKOWSKI & DINAH SHELTON, PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 140 (1992) (noting that, in practice, detention is used in
Austria as a means for eliciting confessions).
30
31

Criminal Procedure Law (Powers of Enforcement – Detention), 1996, section 13(a)(3).
Justus Krümpelmann, Probleme der Untersuchungshaft im deutschen und ausländischen Recht,

ZStW 1052, 1066, 1070 (1970).
32

K. W. Lidstone & T.L. Early, Questioning Freedom: Detention for Questioning in France, Scotland

and England, 31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 488, 501-02 (1982).
33

Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke [1984] Q.B. 209, 216.

34

Toyoji Saito, Preventive Detention in Japan, in FRANKOWSKI & SHELTON, supra note 29, at

182.
35

For a description of these two models see HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL

SANCTION 149-73 (1968).
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conduct a search of his home or to eavesdrop on his conversations, it is also possible
to detain him for the purpose of interrogation.36 The presumption of innocence cannot
shield a person from the very attempt to refute it and it does not prevent the
implementation of measures designed to clarify the suspicion against a person.37
Adherents of detention for the purpose of advancing the investigation view it
as a legitimate investigative measure. Detention is an effective tool for examining the
suspicion against a person, since, without it, the chances for cooperation on the part of
the suspect, and certainly the chances for a confession, are significantly diminished.38
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the suspect is the best source of information.39
Without the suspect’s cooperation, many crimes would go unsolved.40 Perpetrators do
not usually come to the police station on their own initiative in order to confess; in
order to obtain a confession, the police must take some sort of active step of
investigation and detention.41 A suspect must be detained in order to provide the
police with a reasonable opportunity to conduct an incommunicado interrogation
before he concocts a story or decides not to cooperate with his interrogators.42 Every
interrogation necessarily entails a certain degree of inherent pressure that could be
particularly acute for a suspect who has committed the offense attributed to him.
However, this pressure should only trouble a legal system that views a suspect’s
choice to cooperate with the police as something undesirable.43 The belief that it is
possible to successfully interrogate a suspect without detaining him is unrealistic.
When a person arrives to an interrogation after resting at home and receiving the
36

Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV.

1168, 1210 (2001) (relating to deceptive interrogation techniques).
37

For a discussion of the significance of the presumption of innocence, see Rinat Kitai, Presuming

Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 289 (2002).
38

Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke [1984] Q.B. 209, 216 (detaining a suspect for the purpose of exploiting

the elements of stress and pressure entailed by the deprivation of liberty, in order to obtain a statement,
is a proper purpose).
39

PACKER, supra note 35, at 187.

40

Kenneth P. Jones, McNeil v. Wisconsin: Invocation of Right to Counsel Under Sixth Amendment by

Accused at Judicial Proceeding Does Not Constitute Invocation of Miranda Right to Counsel for
Unrelated Charge, 26 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1067 (1992).
41

Van Kessel,, supra note 4, at 144.

42

PACKER, supra note 35, at 187.

43

JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 45 (1993).
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moral support of his family and friends, the chances of getting useful information out
of him for the purposes of the investigation are very slim.44 The burden to prove a
person’s guilt cannot be imposed on law enforcement authorities without equipping
them with the tools necessary for this purpose. Officials should therefore be given a
reasonable period of time to conduct an unhampered investigation.45 The confession is
a valuable tool for ascertaining the truth, enforcing the law, and protecting public
safety.46 Moreover, the confession is not just significant as incriminating evidence for
the purposes of a conviction. A guilty suspect is often the only person who can shed
light on the details of the crime and describe, for instance, what happened to a
deceased victim in his final moments. This information has vast importance for the
public, in general, and for the family and friends of the deceased, in particular.
Indeed, the stupidity of a suspect who gives a confession that goes against his
own best interests is often what helps in ascertaining the truth and enforcing the law;
however, “[t]here is no privilege against inadvertent self-incrimination or even stupid
self-incrimination, but only against compelled self-incrimination.”47 Undoubtedly, a
weak, unsophisticated suspect would be more inclined to confess to the commission
of a crime than a strong, clever suspect, but this assumption should not be troubling.
On the contrary, it should be comforting to know that at least some offenders are
convicted with the help of their own confessions.48

44

Cited in PACKER, supra note 35, at 188 (any type of outside interference diminishes the chance of

cooperation on the part of the suspect during the course of the interrogation and, therefore, he should be
isolated from his family, as well as from an attorney).
45

And see Stewart Field & Andrew West, A Tale of Two Reforms: French Defense Rights and Police

Powers in Transition, 6 CRIM. L.F. 473, 486 (1995) (presenting the prevailing approach in France,
which reflects “… the historic compromise under which the police enjoy an initial period of
investigation that is virtually untrammeled by defense rights.”).
46

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting, stating that “peaceful interrogation is not one of the
dark moments of the law.”); Kimberly A. Roemer, The Maryland Survey 2001-2002: Recent
Decisions: The Court of Appeals of Maryland: IV. Criminal Law and Procedure, 62 MD. L. REV. 722
(2003).
47

Ciriago v. State, 57 Md. App. 563, 574, 471 A.2d 320, 325 (1984); Roemer, supra note 46, at 746.

48

Magid, supra note 36, at 1181; Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Rehnquist,

C.J., Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Reinforcing the arguments of those who support detention for the purpose of
advancing the investigation, it may be added that such detention does not necessarily
start from an assumption of guilt, but rather, its function is to assist in clarifying the
question of the suspect’s guilt or innocence. And, indeed, some countries grant a
power of detention as a means of exerting pressure not only on suspects but also on
witnesses – who are not suspected of having committed a crime – in order to extract
information that they possess.49
B.

Arguments against Detention for the Purpose of Exerting Pressure – the
Danger that the Will of the Interrogee will be Undermined

The due process approach is incompatible with the detention of a suspect for the
purpose of advancing the investigation.50 The main reason for this derives from the
danger of undermining the will of the interrogee.
As important as his statement is for the purpose of solving the crime, a suspect
has the right to remain silent. Custodial interrogation is incompatible with the right of
silence granted to the suspect.51 In fact, just the opposite is true, for the police use
detention in order to ensure that, in practice, the suspect does not exercise his right to
remain silent.52 Since detention could break down the resistance of certain suspects,
inducing them to cooperate with their interrogators, it violates the suspect’s right to
silence. It also undermines his desire not to assist the investigation being conducted
against him and turns him into a vehicle for gathering incriminating evidence.53
Detention is essentially a coercive measure designed to force the suspect into
cooperating, similar to the imprisonment of a witness for contempt of court. Some
scholars believe that there is no contradiction between custodial interrogation and the
49

In France, a power of detention exists for a limited period of time: Field & West, supra note 45, at

482. In Australia, the security services may detain a person who is not a suspect for twenty-four hours
at a time, up to seven days, if there are grounds to assume that he has information related to terrorist
offenses: Christopher Michaelsen, International Human Rights on Trial – The United Kingdom’s and
Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 275, 282-83 (2003).
50
51

PACKER, supra note 35, at 190.
Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation – And the Privilege Against Self-

Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 734 (1988).
52

Lidstone & Early, supra note 32, at 508.

53

Martin Dockray, Notes of Cases: Arrest for Questioning?, 47 MOD. L. REV. 727, 729-30 (1984).
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right to remain silent, since the right to silence is a weak right and only means that a
person cannot be compelled to answer questions.54 This view assumes that custodial
interrogation, in and of itself, is not the equivalent of forcing someone to answer
questions.
And, indeed, the belief that a custodial interrogation undermines the will of the
interrogee is the basis for the claim that detention for the purpose of exerting pressure
is unlawful. It is commonly assumed that a confession obtained by means of brutal
violence is the classic example of an involuntary confession.55 However, the courts
have expanded the definition of an involuntary confession to include situations other
than those in which the confession results from the application of inordinate physical
pressure during an interrogation.56 The voluntariness requirement has been criticized
with the argument that its vagueness is an insufficient guide for police interrogators.57
The courts have indeed tried to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable
police behavior.58 However, if it is acknowledged that a certain degree of pressure
during an interrogation is legitimate, then it is difficult to determine when the applied
pressure crosses the boundary of the permissible.59
The Miranda Court went far beyond the traditional test of voluntariness when
it decisively ruled that a custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.60 The
atmosphere of a custodial interrogation is designed to subjugate the will of the
detainee to that of the interrogator and could lead him to make an involuntary
confession.61 Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Miranda Court attempted to
preserve the autonomy of the individual in a manner that would allow the police to
54

GRANO, supra note 43, at 44.

55

The classic example of such a confession is found in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

56

William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Irrelevance: Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 980 (2001).

57

Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 102; Steven Penney, Theories of Confession

Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 348, 355, 361 (1998); Charles J. Ogletree,
Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1826, 1833 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 451
(1987).
58

Amanda L. Prebble, Manipulated by Miranda: A Critical Analysis of Bright Lines and Voluntary

Confessions Under United States v. Dickerson, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 555, 561 (2000).
59

Stuntz, supra note 56, at 980.

60

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).

61

Id. at 457.
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continue conducting custodial interrogations.62 Accordingly, the Miranda ruling did
not prohibit custodial interrogations, but rather, it required interrogators to inform a
suspect undergoing such an interrogation of his right to remain silent and to consult
with a defense attorney (retained or appointed), and to allow him to avail himself of
these rights, as well as to make it clear to him that his statements are liable to be used
as evidence against him.63 In the absence of these safeguards, an irrebuttable
presumption arises whereby it is deemed that the confession was coerced and is
therefore involuntary.64
1.

Is the Miranda Assumption Regarding the Involuntariness of the
Confession Correct?

What exactly constitutes an involuntary confession is a question containing both
philosophical and empirical aspects. It is very difficult to define the term “will” or the
concept of coercion.65 Aristotle believed that an involuntary action is one performed
under circumstances of coercion or due to ignorance.66 He distinguished between a
voluntary physical action (throwing goods overboard during a storm, in order to save
human life) and the abstract sense of the action – which is involuntary, since no
person would choose to get into a situation where such an action is necessary.67 In the
abstract sense, it is obvious that the will of the suspect is to open the door of the
interrogation room and go home; however, this option is unavailable to him.68 Under
the circumstances of custodial interrogation (obviously, a situation that is intrinsically
involuntary), does a suspect’s admission of guilt truly reflect his will?
62

Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 102; Penney, supra note 57, at 366.

63

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

64

Id. at 468-69.

65

Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present and Future: A Review of the Miranda

Debate: Law, Justice, and Policing, Edited by Richard A. Leo and George C. Thomas III, 36 HOUS. L.
REV. 1251, 1260 (1999).
66

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book III, Voluntary Action and Responsibility, reprinted

in W.T. JONES ET AL. EDS., APPROACHES TO ETHICS 61 (1977).
67

Id. at 61.

68

George C. Thomas III, Book Review: Miranda's Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation

Room. Reviewing Miranda's Waning Protections, By Welsh S. White, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1095
(2003)

12

Detention for the Purpose of Interrogation as Modern “Torture”

We frequently act in response to external pressure. Most people work in order
to make a living, even though they would prefer to spend their time otherwise. Some
people study law in order to please their parents. Are such decisions involuntary?
Conventional wisdom states that a person does not normally lose his ability to choose
except in extraordinary circumstances that interfere with his free choice. Is a custodial
interrogation that does not entail improper measures – such as violence or sleep
deprivation – an inherent factor that could undermine the will of the interrogee?
Some scholars believe that it is a matter of which aspect we focus on: the
volitional aspect of the decision, in which case we would say that the confession is
voluntary, or the external circumstances surrounding the decision, in which case we
would conclude that the confession was coerced.69 To a large extent, this is a
normative choice.70 And, indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that a suspect’s
confession to the police is not voluntary in the same way as a spontaneous confession
to a clergyman, an attorney, or a psychiatrist; but, according to the Court, in this
sense, no admission of guilt is voluntary.71
However, even regarding the external circumstances surrounding the decision,
some scholars reject the contention that custodial interrogation inherently operates to
undermine the will of the individual. The Miranda ruling envisions a weak-willed
suspect, even though this is a person who has allegedly committed offenses that seem
to demand a strong character.72 And, indeed, there are those who reject the
assumption that custodial interrogation entails inherent coercion.73 Thus, Cassell and
Hayman argue that approximately half of all confessions are made during the first
fifteen minutes of the interrogation, and some confessions are even given during the
first five minutes or less.74 A speedy admission of guilt could perhaps indicate that
improper pressure was not exerted on the interrogee. However, findings regarding the
speedy confessions of some interrogees do not contradict the sense of desperation and
helplessness engendered by the very fact that the suspect is being held under arrest in
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a hostile environment.75 A suspect usually expects that his interrogation will be
lengthy and that it will be prolonged until he provides his interrogators with answers
that satisfy them.76 If that is the case, then, when a suspect believes that the
interrogation will not cease until he gives his interrogators the answers that they want
to hear, why not act preemptively in order to avoid unnecessary suffering? In these
circumstances, the actual length of the interrogation is irrelevant in negating a claim
of coercion.77 At any rate, many interrogations are stressful and unpleasant, and, while
they are being conducted, interrogators give the interrogee the feeling that his
conviction is a certainty, with or without his confession.78 Even manuals for police
interrogators assume that the suspect is not easily inclined to confess and that his
resistance must be broken.79
Indeed, it is difficult to seriously argue that the pressures of a normal custodial
interrogation are impossible to withstand. In fact, there are people whose will to resist
is not even broken by torture. A good example of this is the heroic struggle of John
Lilburne, in England, in 1637, who refused to answer the questions of the Star
Chamber regarding the accusations against him, despite the fact that he was flogged
and placed in the pillory.80 However, we are not concerned here with suspects who do
not admit guilt, but rather, with interrogees who do admit guilt during a custodial
interrogation.
Custodial interrogation inherently violates the autonomy of the individual.81
As already indicated, the suspect is interrogated under circumstances in which he
lacks power, control and dignity.82 The separation from family and friends; the
disruption of daily routine; the confinement in a cell, in isolation or with others, some
of whom may be hardened criminals, in conditions constantly reminding the detainee
75
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of his pitiful state – all of this is most certainly capable of undermining the suspect’s
will. Under such circumstances, a waiver of rights cannot truly be considered
voluntary.83
The proof that detention undermines the will of the interrogee is in the very
fact that he has made a confession. A rational suspect, who has not been put under
pressure, would seldom choose to confess.84 This seems obvious. For, under normal
circumstances, a confession goes against the best interests of the suspect.85 Of course,
there are also rational reasons for making a confession: a desire to cleanse one’s
conscience;86 or the suspect’s feeling that “the game is over” and that the police have
already ascertained the fact that he committed the crime, whereas denying it is
pointless and a confession could work to his benefit.87 Some offenders are even proud
of having committed the crime that they are accused of, particularly when it was
committed for ideological reasons. And some psychologists believe that people have
an impulse to confess, which interrogative tactics bring to the fore.88 Notwithstanding
these explanations, it is hard to deny the fact that a person is not normally inclined to
act against his own best interests. However, when interrogated in custodial
surroundings, many suspects feel pressured to speak.89 And, indeed, even Cassell and
Hayman, who do not believe that custodial interrogation inherently undermines the
suspect’s will, have found that custodial interrogations yield many more admissions
of guilt than interrogations conducted while the interrogee is not being held in
custody.90 The necessary conclusion is that a suspect’s admission of guilt is normally
the result of his will having been undermined and not his “will to confess.”
2.

Is It Possible to Dispel the Coercive Atmosphere Engendered by a
Custodial Interrogation?
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The Miranda Court assumed that it was possible to dispel the pressures of a custodial
interrogation by means of proper safeguards, which, if maintained, would ensure that
a suspect’s confession was a reflection of his true will.91 And, indeed, even when a
suspect is actually aware of his rights, the very fact that interrogators have given him
a Miranda warning makes it clear to the suspect that the interrogators are also aware
that they are subject to rules of civilized behavior, and that they cannot wantonly
abuse him.92 In fact, the safeguards established by the Supreme Court in Miranda
were designed to allow the police to continue making use of custodial interrogation,
and that is the result that they have had.93 If we accept the assumption that these
safeguards are capable of dispelling the coercion that exists during a custodial
interrogation, then there is seemingly no reason to oppose detention for the purpose of
interrogation due to a fear that the privilege against self-incrimination will be
violated. The problem is that this assumption appears to be naïve. In practice, most
interrogees waive both their right to remain silent and their right to the presence of a
defense attorney during the interrogation and are willing to cooperate with their
interrogators.94 This fact alone puts into question the effectiveness of the Miranda
rule in protecting the suspect from the coercion entailed by a custodial interrogation.95
And, indeed, when a suspect waives his rights, he is left defenseless against coercive
interrogation tactics employed in an attempt to persuade him to admit guilt.96 In fact,
nearly all interrogations involve deception in one form or another.97 Thus, for
example, an interrogator may deliberately show sympathy towards a person suspected
of a despicable crime in order to give him the feeling that the victim was to blame for
what happened.98 An interrogator may exaggerate the weight of the evidence against
91
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the suspect or lie to him regarding the supposed existence of evidence, such as the
confession of an accomplice, a fingerprint, or the identification of an eyewitness.99
Some scholars, in fact, propose that interrogators be forbidden from using various
types of artifice, such as a promise of leniency in exchange for cooperation or
presenting the evidence against the suspect in a misleading manner.100 Other scholars
reject such proposals, arguing that trickery is essential for proving guilt and that there
is no reason to prohibit artifice during an interrogation or other types of investigative
stratagems, such as eavesdropping.101 In the view of police interrogators, the very
nature of the interrogation makes the use of artifice necessary, since one party – the
police – is interested in ascertaining the truth from the other party – the suspect –
who, if guilty, is naturally interested in concealing it.102 In effect, if such a prohibition
were to encompass all methods by which the police are able to obtain a confession
from a suspect, such as deception or taking advantage of the suspect’s emotional
vulnerability, then the result would be equivalent to a ban on interrogation itself.103
Essentially, there is no way to devise a rule, apart from a total ban on custodial
interrogation, which would truly dispel the coercion that exists under these
circumstances.104
Thus, even taping the interrogation on video would not dispel the coercive
atmosphere that exists in the interrogation room. Video documentation could prove
that interrogators did not employ improper measures (at least not during taping), but it
cannot accurately reflect the suspect’s fears and innermost feelings.105
Not even replacing the police interrogation with a method of judicial
interrogation106 would solve the problem of coercion. A suspect is still in custody
when he comes before a judge.107 For a suspect, standing before a judge might be
99
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even more intimidating that a conversation with a police interrogator at the
stationhouse, due to the difference in status between the judge and the suspect or
because of the formal atmosphere of the judicial institution.108 There is also no reason
to rule out the possibility that the interrogative tactics of a judge convinced of the
suspect’s guilt – like those of a police interrogator – would send a message to the
suspect that his guilt has already been determined, inducing him to confess out of
desperation.
Some scholars believe that in order to dispel the coercive atmosphere the
suspect must be given a true opportunity, which cannot be waived, to consult with a
defense attorney prior to the interrogation.109 As Justice White asked in Miranda: “if
the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as ‘Where were you
last night?’ without having his answer be a compelled one, how can the Court ever
accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants to consult his retained
counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?”110 Indeed, Justice White asked this
question in his dissenting opinion, arguing against the logic of the Miranda ruling.
However, it demonstrates that the same pressures inducing a person to speak to his
interrogators could also cause him to waive his rights.111 Criticism has been leveled at
the proposal that the admissibility of a police confession should be made contingent
on prior consultation with a defense attorney. It has been argued that such a rule
would make it virtually impossible for police to obtain confession evidence.112 Its
implementation would be overly costly and even impractical given the shortage of
competent public defenders, and would cause delays in the interrogation that would
be harmful to the suspect himself.113 This proposal would even lead to an expansion
of the boundaries of non-custodial interrogation.114 However, even if enough
competent public defenders were to be found, prior consultation with an attorney (in
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itself, very desirable) does not guarantee that the confession would be the product of
the suspect’s free will, since the pressurized atmosphere of a police station could
cause an attorney to give his client misleading advice.115 The assumption that a
competent defense attorney would advise his client to remain silent116 is not
empirically correct, and such advice is not necessarily in the client’s best interests
under all circumstances. When the suspect has a reasonable explanation that could
clear him of all suspicion, an attorney might advise him to provide a version because
his silence at the police station could be detrimental to him. In certain countries
(although not in the United States), an adverse inference in support of the
prosecution’s evidence may be drawn from a detainee’s silence at the police
station.117 In the view of police interrogators, the suspect’s silence increases the
suspicion against him.118 Moreover, the fact that the suspect has not provided his
version at the first opportunity available to him could weaken the credibility of a later
version provided in court. When the police have not revealed the evidentiary material
that they possess to the suspect prior to the filing of an indictment, a defense attorney
is forced to advise his client to either remain silent or answer questions in a state of
uncertainty, and this advice could naturally turn out to be erroneous.119 Furthermore,
there are even defense attorneys who fail to take an adversarial posture, cooperating
with the police in exerting pressure on the suspect to admit guilt, and others who
acquiesce in the face of a hostile and aggressive interrogation, leaving the suspect to
his own devices.120
In short, these types of proposals, which go even further than Miranda,
provide only a partial solution to the problem of coercion. Insofar as it is directed at
extracting a confession from a suspect, a police interrogation is inherently coercive,
since it is designed to persuade the suspect to make “free” statements, instead of
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“selling” them afterwards within the context of plea bargaining negotiations with the
prosecution.121

III.

The Consequences of a Custodial Confession

Even if there are suspects whose will is not undermined and who cooperate
voluntarily, given the coercive atmosphere engendered by detention itself, it is
impossible to differentiate between a voluntary and an involuntary confession.122
Therefore, the confession of a suspect at the police station, obtained while he is in
custody, should be treated as involuntary and, consequently, as inadmissible in
court.123 Treating a custodial confession in this manner is justified by the two main
rationales underlying the requirement of voluntariness: 1) ensuring the reliability of
the confession, and 2) protecting the right of the suspect to reach an autonomous
decision.124
A.

Ensuring the Reliability of the Confession

Although various rationales underlie the voluntariness requirement, some scholars
argue that its main justification is the fear concerning the reliability of an involuntary
confession.125 And, indeed, in American courts during the nineteenth century, the
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basis for the rule excluding an involuntary confession was not the privilege against
self-incrimination, but rather the desire to reduce the possibility of an erroneous
conviction based on a questionable confession.126 Therefore, some scholars argue that
the primary inquiry should focus on the question of whether the procedure employed
to obtain a confession engenders an unreasonable risk that an innocent person would
falsely confess.127 According to this approach, there is no real reason to place
constraints on an interrogation that are unnecessary for the purpose of ensuring the
reliability of the confession.128 In contrast to those scholars who argue that false
confessions are a serious problem for the criminal justice system and constitute a
widespread phenomenon,129 others argue that these claims have never been proven
empirically and that the research on this subject is mostly anecdotal.130 According to
this view, there is no basis for the belief that an innocent person would confess, and
we should be glad that at least the “weak” offenders do confess.131 Moreover, the
factors leading to false confessions should be examined. Thus, if it is proven that false
confessions are unrelated to the manner in which the interrogation is conducted – for
instance, when a suspect confesses due to his desire to cover up for another person –
then there is no reason to place limits on interrogative practices in order to prevent
such confessions.132 An empirical study of this sort regarding the extent of the
phenomenon of false confessions is not a simple matter, since positive innocence can
be proven in relatively few cases, for example, when a DNA test proves that the
suspect did not commit the crime to which he has confessed.133
In order to disqualify an interrogation method, it must be shown that it tends to
yield unreliable confessions.134 According to Grano, those who speak of the danger of
false confessions express a willingness to sacrifice numerous reliable confessions in
order to prevent unreliable ones that are given in an attempt to cover up for another
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person or due to the weakness of the suspect.135 In Grano’s opinion, a position
supporting the inadmissibility of confessions cannot be defended unless it
demonstrates a tangible danger that the innocent will falsely confess.136 Grano posits
that there is no significant danger that an innocent person will be convicted on the
basis of a confession.137 If we exclude custodial confessions due to their unreliability,
the same logic should also lead to the exclusion of eyewitness testimony because of
the danger of an error in identification.138 However, Grano argues that the innocent
should not be protected against conviction at all costs.139
Although it seems counterintuitive to think that an innocent person would
confess to a crime that he did not commit,140 empirically, it is impossible to deny that
innocent persons do confess, even if the dimensions of this phenomenon are
disputed.141 However, apart from the question of to what extent it is possible to
empirically prove the danger of false confessions, it can be logically proven. And this
is the case even if we accept Grano’s assumptions (which seem to me to be correct)
that a custodial interrogation does not engender the same type of coercion as that
which allows a defendant to avail himself of a defense of duress142 and that, even if it
is unpleasant, such an interrogation is not cruel and inhumane.143 Grano argues that,
although it is hard to deny a causal relation between the pressure of detention and the
confession, in the sense of “but for causation,” this does not mean that custodial
interrogation is improper.144 However, if it is the coercive atmosphere of detention
that yields the confession, then, from the confession itself, it is impossible to
distinguish between guilty and innocent suspects.
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In the absence of corroborating evidence, there is no true possibility to
distinguish between the guilty and the innocent.145 Interrogators could view the
suspect’s distress as evidence of his guilt.146 The tension and anxiety felt by an
innocent person in a custodial setting, and from the interrogation itself, could be
interpreted as the attempt of a guilty person to fool the interrogators.147 The internal
resistance of an innocent person against confessing to a crime that he did not commit
is not necessarily stronger than the survival instinct of a guilty person who is trying to
conceal his guilt.
Mark Godsey has expressed the view that the proper test for excluding a
confession pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, both from a
textual perspective, as well the historical development of legislation and the privilege
against self-incrimination, should be based on a standard of compulsion rather than
voluntariness.148 According to this view, the Court has confused two distinct
doctrines: the privilege against self-incrimination (Nemo tenetur), which developed in
response to harsh interrogation tactics, and the doctrine of voluntariness, which was a
rule of evidence designed to exclude unreliable confessions, regardless of the
interrogation practices employed to extract them.149 Thus, for example, the promise of
a reward, such as leniency in punishment, raises a significant concern for the
reliability of the confession, although it does not violate any notion of basic human
dignity.150 Even if we accept this analysis, there is nothing to prevent us from
reaching the same conclusion as the Miranda Court, whereby the very conduct of a
custodial interrogation engenders coercion151 and that, coercion, by its very nature,
raises a concern for the reliability of the confession.
Grano assumes that, as a rule, suspects are guilty. In his words, “[p]utting
aside the interrogation of mere witnesses, police interrogation is generally intended to
145
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obtain from guilty suspects self-incriminating statements and clues to additional
evidence or other suspects.”152 This conception of guilt, which does not conform to
the fact that most suspects are not even charged with a crime,153 is dangerous. When
interrogators assume guilt and believe that the suspect is concealing the truth from
them, they might focus their efforts on undermining the suspect’s will, instead of on
gathering evidence that could establish or diminish the suspicion against him.
It is undisputed that, with a certain degree of coercion, an innocent person
would be just as willing to admit guilt as an offender.154 Detention constitutes an
improper application of pressure that, to some extent, is the equivalent of torture.155
The decisive factor in excluding a custodial confession is that detention, by its very
nature, does not serve to advance the investigation, but rather, the advancement of the
investigation is facilitated by undermining the suspect’s will. This is what
distinguishes between detention and other investigative techniques, such as
eavesdropping or bodily searches, which are implemented in order to ascertain the
truth. Detention for the purpose of exerting pressure cannot serve as a reliable tool for
screening out the innocent from among the guilty. It tests a person’s ability to endure
suffering and not the reliability of the statements made by detained suspects. It is
liable to undermine the resistance of the weak, whereas it fails to break the willpower
of stronger individuals.
Some scholars indeed warn that a sweeping prohibition against the
admissibility of police confessions would actually lead to increased pressure being
exerted on suspects, for when interrogators have nothing to lose – from an evidentiary
perspective – they would employ improper measures in order to uncover other
evidence through the suspect, such as witness testimony and physical evidence.156
And, indeed, in Germany, during the Middle Ages, interrogators also used torture in
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order to obtain physical evidence that was essential for meeting the heavy burden to
prove the guilt of the suspect.157 Nevertheless, this concern may be overcome by
means of an exclusionary rule. At any rate, it cannot serve as an independent
argument against the inadmissibility of a custodial confession.
B.

Protecting the Autonomy of the Individual

The Supreme Court has held that the reliability and voluntariness of the confession
are two separate issues.158 In several judgments – Escobedo159 and Miranda are the
most famous – the Court has drawn a link between the voluntariness doctrine and the
privilege against self-incrimination.160 According to this rationale, the voluntariness
requirement is designed to protect the suspect’s right to reach an autonomous
decision.161 It is founded on an independent right to silence that operates regardless of
abusive treatment or a fear concerning the unreliability of the confession.162 The right
to remain silent places a severe constraint on the state’s ability to exert its power over
the individual and protects the individual from an invasion of his privacy during the
investigation. The individual, as an entity separate from the state, has the right to
maintain his own personal, independent space.163 The right of silence respects the
autonomy of the suspect, who is entitled to decide to what extent he wishes to
cooperate with his accusers and what is the best way to defend himself as a party to a
criminal proceeding.164
Some scholars claim that on its own – independent of concerns for the
reliability of confessions and the need to restrict unfair investigative practices – the
rationale of protecting the autonomy of the individual does not justify the privilege
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against self-incrimination or an exclusionary confessions rule.165 However, there are
sound arguments for preserving the individual’s autonomy not to answer questions
against his will.
The right to remain silent is designed to ensure humane treatment, which is
reflected by the belief that suspects, both the innocent and the guilty alike, should not
be exposed to intimidating, intensive, and invasive interrogations.166 Thus, for
example, the right to silence enables a suspect to terminate the interrogation after an
hour of patiently explaining to interrogators that he is innocent. Without a right to
silence, a suspect would be forced to submit to a continuous interrogation lasting
hours and even days.167 Abolition of the right to remain silent would leave a suspect,
who must answer all questions posed to him during the interrogation, helpless against
the power of the state.168 The awareness of the suspect that he is not required to
answer the questions of his interrogators and that he is guaranteed an impenetrable,
autonomous personal space, preserves his dignity as a human being and his sense of
self-worth, and slightly moderates the humiliation naturally associated with being
interrogated as a suspect. It helps to prevent the authorities from acting oppressively,
something that could stem from a sense of unlimited power. The right to remain silent
makes it clear to law enforcement officials that their ability to exercise authority over
the interrogee and to probe his thoughts is limited. This knowledge carries great
significance, since, despite the fact that the individual enjoys a normative presumption
of innocence at trial, in practice, no similar presumption exists in the interrogation
room.169 In fact, just the opposite is the case – police interrogators often treat the
suspect as if he is guilty, rejecting as worthless any explanation of innocence that he
offers.170 However, the knowledge that a suspect may refuse to cooperate, causes
interrogators to view him as a person with a will of his own, which must be respected,
and not as an instrument under their control. Such a view helps to deter interrogators
from acting improperly. Therefore, the right to silence serves to restrain the police,
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preventing them from resorting to improper and unlawful measures.171 Historical
experience warns of the danger embodied in giving too much power to law
enforcement officials. This danger also exists in modern times.172

IV.

Detention for the Purpose of Applying Investigative Measures in a
Custodial Setting

As already indicated, detention for the purpose of interrogation is not only necessary
as a means for exerting pressure on the suspect to cooperate with his interrogators in
the investigation of the offense attributed to him. The police sometimes need to detain
a suspect in order to apply investigative measures that can only be conducted in a
custodial setting. The main investigative measure of this type is to plant an
undercover agent in the suspect’s cell posing as a fellow detainee. There are those
who believe that taking advantage of the detention facility in order to operate an
undercover agent in this way is a legitimate investigative ploy that does not violate the
suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination.173 A person has the right to remain
silent, but this does not prevent the police from trying to obtain the suspect’s
confession through indirect means. The Supreme Court has maintained that the
underlying rationale of the Miranda ruling is to prevent “…government officials from
using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be
given in an unrestrained manner.”174 However, the element of coercion that exists in a
normal interrogation is absent when the suspect talks to a cellmate.175 Ploys designed
to lull the suspect into a false sense of security do not contradict the desire to dispel
the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation room.176 After all, even when a person
171
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tells his story to a fellow prisoner – who is not an undercover agent – this same
prisoner could reveal his secret to the authorities in exchange for a reward.177 There is
no need to inform the suspect of his rights when he is unaware that he is speaking to
law enforcement agent.178 In fact, it is obvious that an undercover agent cannot inform
the suspect of his rights, for this would reveal his identity and defeat the entire
purpose of the covert operation.179 On the other hand, detention provides the police
with control over the suspect’s environment.180 A detainee does not choose his
cellmates. He is unable to leave and he cannot ask them to leave the cell.181 A
coercive atmosphere, although of a different nature, also exists when a detainee
speaks with an undercover agent. The anxiety engendered by the custodial setting
often leads the suspect to seek comfort and relief by speaking to those nearby.182 In
contrast to a real detainee, an undercover agent trained in psychological techniques
could manipulate the suspect into confessing.183 Such techniques could, for example,
lead the suspect to invent a criminal past in order to meet the expectations of his
cellmate.184 An investigative ruse that exploits the shaky emotional state of the
suspect for the purpose of getting him to confess to his acts is both unfair and
unreliable.
Nevertheless, the argument that custodial interrogation constitutes an improper
pressure is less convincing when confinement is necessary for the purpose of
investigative measures that can only be conducted in a custodial setting, and not
merely for the sake of applying pressure. However, since such measures may be
employed for any type of offense, regardless of its severity, circumstances, or the
degree of public interest in its detection, this could lead to a “slippery slope,” turning
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pretrial detention into a norm that takes on the outward appearance of punishment.
Furthermore, detention for the purpose of exerting pressure in a custodial setting
should still be rejected in principle, considering the role of detention and the
procedural safeguards that a suspect should enjoy at the pretrial hearing where the
state asks the court to deprive him of his liberty. In the criminal process, a person is
usually put behind bars only as a result of a criminal conviction and a sentence of
imprisonment. Therefore, detention is incompatible with the duty to treat a defendant
as innocent until proven guilty.185 Indeed, it may be acknowledged that, under certain
circumstances, it is legitimate to jail someone prior to a conviction; for instance, when
the suspect poses a clear danger to public safety or to the normal course of
investigative and trial proceedings. However, detention for the purpose of
interrogation is not intended to prevent an improper future act by the suspect. Such
confinement violates the presumption of innocence to an unnecessary extent. Given
the considerable harm caused to an individual by detention, it is necessary to exhaust
other investigative methods that do not entail a deprivation of freedom and do not
create an outward appearance of punishment.
Moreover, when the state requests detention for the purpose of advancing the
investigation, the suspect has no control over the decision to detain him by proposing
alternatives that would dispel the prima facie risk that he poses, as he does when it is
argued that his detention is necessary in order to prevent an obstruction of justice or
the commission of dangerous offenses in the future. 186 In effect, the suspect is unable
to present an effective argument against these grounds for detention. Consequently, it
is impossible to ensure minimal due process when the state wishes to detain the
suspect for the purpose of advancing the investigation.
As already indicated, detention for the purpose of interrogation could also
enable the seizure of physical findings in the detention facility for the purpose of
running a DNA test or uncovering evidence. In some cases (such as when there is a
reasonable fear that the suspect has ingested narcotics), a person may be detained on
the ground of obstruction of justice. In other cases, statutory provisions must be
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enacted granting the power to compel a suspect to provide a DNA sample or to allow
an invasive body search. When a suspect unlawfully objects to a search or an
examination, only a brief confinement is necessary for this purpose, provided that the
law permits the search or examination to be conducted through the exercise of
reasonable force.

V.

Conclusion

An unavoidable tension exists between the desire to protect the autonomy of the
individual and the desire to advance the investigation by obtaining evidence through
the interrogation of a suspect.187
Detention is not a legitimate investigative measure.188 It increases the danger
that false confessions will be elicited from suspects who wish to be released, thus
harming innocent persons. It also increases the danger that involuntary confessions
will be obtained from guilty persons who are forced to waive their right to defend
themselves against the charges. Detaining a suspect merely for the purpose of
advancing the investigation cannot be justified if there is no genuine, substantiated
fear that he will obstruct justice or endanger public safety. However, officials should
not be forbidden from taking the statement of a suspect who has been justifiably
detained, notwithstanding the need to protect his rights. A suspect who wishes to tell
his story should be given the opportunity to do so and clear himself of suspicion.
Under such circumstances, the physical coercion that might undermine the suspect’s
will is not the objective but only a consequence of detention. Nevertheless, since a
suspect usually confesses to the police only after his instinct for survival has
collapsed, in these circumstances – from the confession itself – it is impossible to
differentiate between a false and a reliable confession.
The Miranda Court vacillated on this matter: it assumed that a custodial
interrogation is designed to undermine the will of the suspect and that this is
improper. This assumption seemingly requires the conclusion that custodial
interrogation is improper and that, unfortunately, when it is unavoidable (such as
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when there are grounds for detaining the suspect), it should not be given any weight.
However, the Miranda Court upheld the possibility to conduct custodial
interrogations by establishing safeguards that supposedly dispel the inherent coercion
that it entails. As I have tried to show, there is no true possibility to dispel the pressure
of a custodial interrogation and, consequently, to eliminate the danger that the will of
the suspect will be undermined.
In the past, it was assumed that a confession could not be obtained from a
suspect without the use of torture.189 Today, it is assumed that, without detention, it is
impossible to induce a suspect to cooperate with his interrogators and to provide a
version (preferably one that would confirm the suspicions of the interrogator).
Nowadays, detention replaces the torture that was employed in the past as a means to
obtain a confession. However, the road to the truth is not traveled by breaking the
interrogee’s will. Nor should it be.
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